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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH
ONEL J. BARNETT and EVELYN

I. BARNETT,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
STATE AUTOMOBILE &
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS,
Defendant and Appellant,
and
DIVERSIFIED INSURANCE
AGENCY, and A-1 AGENCIES
DIVERSIFIED,
Defendants.

Case No.
12264

BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE AUTOMOBILE &
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on a fire insurance contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment on separate jury verdicts were made and
entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Diversified Insurance Agency and State Automobile
& Casualty Underwriters in the amount of $23,484.07.
1
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The lower court granted a judgment of dismissal in favor
of the defendant A-1 Agencies Diversified dismissing the
plaintiffs' claims against them.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This defendant seeks reversal of the judgment of the
lower court against it and an order directing the lower
court to grant judgment in its favor as a matter of law
or in the alternative to grant this defendant a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters (hereinafter called State Auto) is an insurance company authorized to write fire insurance in the State of Utah. Guarantee Security Insurance Company is an insurance company of which State Auto had assumed all obligations.
Plaintiffs, the Barnetts, are residents of Vernal, Utah.
On October 19, 1967, the Barnetts' home and furnishings were damaged by fire. A Guaranty Security Insurance homeowners policy (No. HO 112-63035) including fire coverage on the Barnett home had expired October 1, 1967, eighteen days prior to the fire.
Because State Auto later assumed the liabilities under this policy, the policy will hereinafter be referred to
as the State Auto policy.
2
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Mr. Barnett admitted at trial that he had not read
the policy or made note of the expiration date prior to
locking the policy in a Vernal bank safety deposit box
(R.179, 191) and had not requested that he be notified
prior to the expiration date (R. 199).
Five or six days after the fire Mrs. Barnett backdated a check to October 1, 1967, in an attempt to create
after-the-fact coverage and mailed it to Diversified Insurance Agency, through whom the State Auto policy had
originally been written. The check was returned (R.196,
217) (Exhibit 26-DA-1).
No proof of loss was ever filed with State Auto
(R.198).
For about twenty-two years prior to October 1, 1964,
Nob le Kimball, a local insurance agent, handled the fire
insurance needs of the Barnetts (R.187). Noble Kimball
enjoyed the full confidence of the Barnetts in their insurance needs and always selected the insurer without any
preference designation by the Barnetts (R.188).
Noble Kimball over the years had placed the Barnetts insurance with several companies (R.187). From
July 5, 1961, to July 5, 1964, they were insured with the
Pearl Assurance Company under policy F 10 78 45 75
(Exhibit 2-P) (R.171).
A few days before the State Auto policy became effective on October 1, 1964, Mr. Barnett was introduced
to Richard Salisbury, president and manager of Diversi-
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fied Insurance Agency, who had been brought into his
office by Noble Kimball (R.174). Mr. Kimball explained
that he was retiring from business and that Diversified
Insurance Agency was going to handle his accounts from
that time on. Richard Salisbury told Mr. Barnett that
he would do his best to continue the services Noble Kimball had previously given and Mr. Barnett accepted Richard Salisbury as his new agent (R.176).
Diversified Insurance Agency issued the State Auto
homeowner's policy effective October 1, 1964 including
fire coverage, personal liability coverage, and medical
payments coverage. This was a broader coverage than
in the Pearl Assurance policy furnished by Noble Kimball which had expired on July 5, 1964, nearly three
months before (R.178).
Apparently Noble Kimball had let the Barnetts' fire
insurance lapse for the period between July 5, 1964 when
Pearl Assurance policy expired and October 1, 1964 when
the State Auto policy became effective. No evidence of
coverage during this three month period was presented
at trial.
Despite this evidence of a three month lapse in coverage Mr. Barnett was allowed, over objections, to testify
that it was the custom and practice of Mr. Kimball to
renew their fire insurance and bill the Barnetts (R.169-70,
190). It was undisputed that Noble Kimball was never
an insurance agent or representative of Guarantee Security or State Auto, the issuers of the policy upon which
this case is based.

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs called only one other witness besides the
Barnetts - William H. Slaugh, an agent serving a single
company - State Farm Insurance. State Farm Insurance
does not operate through the American Agency System
which means it remains the owner of all renewal business
as opposed to the local agent having all renewal rights
(R.235-36). Mr. Slaugh, over objections, was permitted
to testify about State Farm's procedures of notice to insureds of forthcoming renewal dates and cancellation
upon expiration of the policy (R.219-22, 226-30). The
court further permitted Mr. Slaugh to testify, over objections, as to the practice of other companies in sending
notices of expiration or renewal. His testimony was based
only upon his past observations of other company's policies (R.229-30).
Mr. Slaugh admitted that he had never heard of Diversified Insurance Agency or seen a policy issued through
it prior to his appearance as a witness (R.230).
In October 1964, the effective date of the State Auto
homeowner's policy, the Kolob Corporation served as a
general agent for Guarantee Security Insurance (R.276).
Later, Diversified Insurance Agency became Guaranty
Security's general agent. On February 28, 1966, State
Auto assumed the liabilities and obligations of Guarantee
Security Insurance Company (Exhibit 1-P).
On November 28, 1965 Guarantee Security cancelled
the agency agreement with Diversified and appointed
Trans-Western Insurance Agency as its new general agent
(R.277). Thereafter, Diversified was without authority

5
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to accept or bind State Auto or Guarantee Security on
new risks though authorized to service policies then in
effect until their expiration dates.
Mr. Elwood Johnson, manager of the regional State
Auto office, testified that State Auto operated through
the American Agency System in which the agents, not the
company, owned the right of renewals, i.e., State Auto
had no right to bypass the local agent in an effort to renew an about-to-expire policy (R.276). Accordingly, State
Auto did not notify plaintiffs their policy would expire
October 1, 1967.
The Barnetts filed a Complaint, an Amended Complaint, and a Second Amended Complaint (R.l, 41, 58).
They allege that on October 19, 1967, their home and
furnishings were damaged by fire (R.l, 41, 59) and that
on said date State Auto's policy No. HO 112-63035 was
in full force and effect (R.1, 41, 58). There is no allegation in any of the pleadings that State Auto had a duty
to notify plaintiffs of their expiration of their policy or
warn them prior to expiration. Neither do the pleadings
allege that Diversified was acting within the scope of
its authority as an agent for State Auto when it omitted
to notify the Plaintiff of the expiration of their policy,
nor is there an allegation that State Auto was negligent,
careless or breached its contract in failing to notify plaintiffs their policy would expire October 1, 1967.

6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE CAN BE NO RECOVERY UNDER THE
STATE AUTO HOMEOWNER'S POLICY BECAUSE
THE POLICY COVERAGE HAD EXPIRED BEFORE
THE LOSS OCCURRED.

Plaintiffs filed an original Complaint, an Amended
Complaint, and a Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint alleges three causes of action:
one against State Auto, one against Diversified Insurance
Agency, and one against A-1 Agencies Diversified.
The cause of action alleged against State Auto m
each complaint is an action in contract. With respect to
the State Auto policy each complaint contains the sentence:
"That said insurance policy was in full force and
effect on October 19, 1967." (R.1, 41, 58)
October 19, 1967 is the date of the fire which damaged the Barnett home.
Plaintiffs' contract theory of recovery under the policy was presented to the jury in Instruction No. 12 which
stated:

*

*

*

"The First Cause of Action in plaintiff's complaint is directed against only the defendant, State
Automobile and Casualty Underwriters, and with
respect to that defendant plaintiffs allege that said
company issued a fire insurance policy upon their
home in Vernal, Utah, and its contents and fur-
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ther allege that said policy was in full force and
effect on October 19, 1967, and that pursuant to
the terms of the policy said defendant is liable to
plaintiffs for the loss sustained by them as a consequence of such fire." (R.91) (Emphasis added.)

*

*

*

The jury therefore was instructed that any recovery
against State auto must be "pursuant to the terms of the
policy."
Utah Code Ann. § 31-19-11 (1953) requires that the
policy term be specified in an insurance contract:

"31-19-11. What constitutes policy - Required specifications in policy. -( 1) The written

instrument, in which a contract of insurance is set
forth, is the policy.
(2) A policy shall specify:

*

*

*

(e) the time at which the insurance thereunder takes effect and the period during which
the insurance is to continue; * * *"
On the front of the State Auto policy directly under
the name and address of the Barnetts is stated the coverage term of the policy. The term is from October 1, 1964
to October 1, 1967.
Item nine (9) under the "General Conditions" portion of the policy contains the words "Policy Term" in
bold face type followed by:

8
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"This policy applies only to losses or occurrences during the policy term." (Exhibit 1-P)
Under no construction of the policy can any loss
occurring after October 1, 1967 be deemed covered "pursuant to the terms of the policy."
12 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 247 §
7175 (1943) states:
"Fire policies expire according to their terms.
Courts cannot disregard a plain, unambiguous
statement in the policy as to the expiration date,
in the absence of accident, mistake, or fraud."
There is no ambiguity about the expiration date of
the policy - it is conspicuous on the front of the policy.
Plaintiffs have not alleged the October 1, 1967 expiration
date was placed on the policy through accident, mistake
or fraud. To require payment under the policy for a loss
occurring after coverage had expired is to ignore the
clear and unambiguous language of this contract and require the payment of a loss for which no premium had
been charged or paid.
Such a result is contrary to the law and specifically
to Marriot v. Pacific National Life Assurance Co., 24
Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981, 983 (1970) where this court
stated:
"[I]nasmuch as insurance coverage is based
on contract, unless there is some good reason to
the contrary, we are obliged to assume that language included therein was put there for a purpose, and to give it effect where its meaning is
clear and unambiguous.''
9
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The premium paid by Mr. Barnett was for the three
year period from October 1, 1964 to October 1, 1967.
He received the coverage during that period in return
for his premium.
Any coverage the Barnetts had after October 1, 1967
could not have been provided under this policy. If the
coverage was provided beyond October 1, 1967 under
any other contract there could still be no liability to State
Auto because plaintiffs cause of action was based on the
policy which expired October 1, 1967.
It was error to submit State Auto's liability under
the policy to the jury. In finding State Auto liable the
jury ignored their instructions that State Auto's liability
must be found from the policy. State Auto should be
held not liable under the policy as a matter of law.
POINT II
STATE AUTO HAD NO DUTY TO NOTIFY THE
PLAINTIFFS OF THE EXPIRATION DA TE OR TO
RENEW THE POLICY.

The Barnett home fire occurred nineteen days after
the policy expired. There is no provision in the policy
requiring State Auto to renew the policy or notify the insureds of expiration. The policy was not written for a
continuous period and State Auto had never insured the
Barnett home previously. If suit were brought by an insurer to collect a renewal premium due after expiration
of a policy and the insured had already given his business to another insurer, it is certain that the insured
10
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would be outraged and for sure no court in the land
would allow a recovery of the renewal premium by the
insurance company from the former insured.
The duty to notify of cancellation or renew has been
argued to courts in many different jurisdictions.
The cases consistently hold that under conditions as
presented by this case there is no duty to notify or renew
absent a specific provision to that effect in the policy.

Kapahua v. Hawaiian Insurance and Guaranty Co.,
447 P.2d 669 (Hawaii 1968), involved the issue of duty
to renew. Kapahua purchased automobile insurance from
the defendant through an agent by the name of Mossman for a term stated from May 9, 1966 to May 9, 1967.
The contract contained no grace period provision nor any
provision that a notice of expiration would be sent.
Plaintiff sued the insurer for damages incurred in an
accident seventeen days after the policy expired. Plaintiffs' theory was that the defendants were negligent in
their alleged duty, derived from an implied contractual
duty determined by custom in the insurance industry, to
notify her of the expiration of the policy or to renew the
policy automatically. The trial court directed a verdict
for the defendants. In affirming the judgment the Hawaii
Supreme Court stated:
"It may well be in the public interest that

automobile insurance policies should not lapse due
to forgetfulness on the part of the insured, or inconsistent action of insurers and that a duty be
imposed upon the insurers to give notice of expiration before terminating the current policies.
11
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But, unless expressly written in the insurance contract, such duty may only be imposed by the legislature." Id. at 671.
The court pointed out that the rule urged by plaintiff would violate the statute requiring insurance agreements to be in writing since it would impose a duty upon
the insured to pay premiums to the company beyond the
expiration date of the policy.

Munro v. Boston Insurance Co., 370 Mich. 604, 122
N.W.2d 654 (1963), involved the same issue. The Munro
case was an action on a fire insurance policy in which
the policy expired August 29, 1960. The policy was
written by a local agency which subsequently was sold
to Holly Insurance Agency. Holly Insurance Agency did
not notify the insured either before or after August 29,
1960, that the policy would or had expired. The dwelling described in the policy was destroyed by fire on January 23, 1961. After the fire the plaintiffs were advised
no payment would be made because the policy had expired. Suit was instituted on the basis of an alleged custom observed by the companies in the area of giving
notice prior to expiration of fire insurance policies.
In affirming a directed verdict for the insurer the
Michigan Supreme Court stated:
"The provisions of the policy before us were
duly observed. The installments of the premium
were presumably paid as they fell due. The policy
was not one for a continuing period based on
compliance with its terms but, rather, specified
clearly and unequivocally the date of expiration.
12
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Plaintiffs were bound by that provision. No obligation rested on defendant to seek the execution
of another contract, and liability was not extended
under the expired undertaking on the theory advanced by appellants. (Emphasis added.)

*

*

*

"The acceptance of appellant's claim would
result, in effect, in creation of liability following
the expiration of the policy as written, and would
from a practical standpoint be the equivalent of
creating a new contract between the parties."

Kimball v. Clinton County New Patrons Fire Relief
Assn., 23 A.D.2d 519, 255 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1965), is also
factually similar to the matter before this court. Kimball
brought suit against a fire insurer for damages arising
from the destruction of a building after the expiration
date of the policy. The policy contained no provision
requiring the insurance company to give notice of an
expiration date. Kimball relied on a custom of the insurer and the insured's agent to discuss renewal coverage
or new and different coverage prior to expiration which
was not done prior to the last expiration. The court affirmed judgment for the insurance company stating:
"The policy was not cancelled during its term.
It contained no provision requiring notice of its
expiration other than the expiration date appearing therein; nor, of course, was there a requirement of notice of any assessment not applicable
during this term.
"The terms of the policy were always within
the knowledge of the plaintiff, and if he failed to
remember the policy expired at a certain time
before the fire, it was his own negligence, and

13
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not the defendant's which prevented the plaintiff from renewing the policy." 255 N.Y.S.2d at
367.
POINT III
THE TESTIMONY OF MR. BARNETT AND WILLIAM SLAUGH ON "CUSTOM OR USAGE" WAS
IMPROPER.

Throughout the trial plaintiffs presented evidence,
over repeated objections, to show alteration of the policy
through "custom and usage."
Though the policy was clear as to its term, plaintiffs
argued that custom required State Auto to continue coverage beyond the expiration date stated in the policy.
1 Couch on Insurance 2d 757 § 15:61 (1959) states:

"Usage or custom at variance with terms of
contract. If the contract is stated in clear, positive, and unambiguous terms, usage or custom
cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the terms
used." (Emphasis added.)

Allowing evidence before the jury which directly
conflicted wtih the clear terms of the State Auto policy
was therefore error.
Even where the evidence of usage or custom is presented to show some act not at variance with the contract there are certain characteristics which it must possess
before it can be admitted into evidence:

14
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"Essentials of usage constituting aid in construction. In order that a usage may be ad-

mitted in evidence as an aid to the construction
of an insurance policy, it must possess certain
characteristics, namely, it must be generally well
established and notorious, uniform, and reasonable. It must be general, that is, general to the
whole mercantile world, or in regard to the particular trade to which it has reference." 1 Couch
on Insurance 2d 759 § 15:63 (1959). (Emphasis
added.)
State Auto, as many insurers in the industry, operates through what is called the "American Agency System." This system recognizes that many customers have
been secured solely through the efforts of agents who
represent several insurers. As such, the customer is deemed
to be the agent's asset as opposed to the insurer's. Therefore only the agent has the right to directly contact the
customer in securing renewal of a policy. Automatic renewal or efforts to secure a renewal by the insurer directly with the customer would violate the regulations
of the American Agency System. The customer has the
advantage under this system of not being "locked in"
to one company and therefore being able to place his
insurance with the most favorable insurer among the
several his agent represents.
At trial, Mr. Elwood Johnson, manager of the regional State Auto office, explained how the American
Agency System operated. He testified that State Auto
operated through the American Agency System (R.276).

15
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Other insurers, not members of the American Agency
System, own the renewal rights of their policies and therefore contact the customer directly in seeking a renewal.
The custom of giving notice of expiration and cancellation, therefore, is not general to the whole insurance
trade. Obviously, then, the custom cannot be binding in
its effect upon the insurers not participating in the custom:
"It is to be noted that the custom or usage
which gives rise to a duty to give notice is not
custom or usage in the general sense in which
those terms are employed in contract law but
relates only to the practice of the particular insurer." 5 Couch on Insurance 2d 662 § 30: 128
( 1960) (Emphasis added.)

All of the evidence presented by plaintiffs in attempting to show a custom binding upon State Auto was
objected to as without foundation, immaterial, irrelevant, or based on hearsay. (R. 169-72, 175-76, 180-83,
220-22, 227-33, 239-47).
Mr. Barnett testified that his agent, Noble Kimball,
had always renewed his fire insurance since 1942 without fail (R.187). Plaintiffs were unable to explain, however, why Mr. Kimball had allowed a three month lapse
between the effective date of the State Auto policy and
the policy with Pearl Assurance held prior to the State
Auto policy.
Mr. Barnett admitted that the renewal or notice of
expiration was always Mr. Kimball's act and not the
insurers. The Barnetts' insurance had been placed in var16
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10us companies through the years (R.187). The State
Auto policy on the Barnett home which expired prior to
the fire was the only State Auto policy Mr. Barnett ever
owned because Noble Kimball had never, in his entire
career, represented State Auto.
Plaintiffs also called William H. Slaugh to testify
concerning insurers' renewal practices. Mr. Slaugh was
allowed to testify as to the practices of other companies
though he himself represented only one insurer. The
company he represented did not operate through the
American Agency System (R.235-36). His knowledge of
other insurers' renewal practices was in fact not based
upon custom at all but upon what was contained in the
policies of these other companies (R.229-30) !
The evidence of renewal customs should never have
been admitted because no foundation for the testimony
was established which showed the custom to be that of
State Auto as opposed to some other insurer. Noble Kimball's treatment of the Barnett account over the years
could not establish a custom binding upon State Auto a company he never represented.
Despite the uncontested fact that the Barnetts had
owned only a singly policy with State Auto and this single
policy was written through an agent they had never seen
but once (R. 194, 199, 200), the issue of custom contradicting the policy's terms was allowed to go to the jury.
In the recent case of Okamura v. Time Insurance Co.,
24 Utah 2d 209, 468 P.2d 958 (1970), this court rejected
17
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the theory that acceptance of one prior premium after the
due date was sufficient to establish a custom waiving
prompt payment:
"A custom or usage exists only when followed
for a substantial period of time." 468 P.2d at 959.
It is clear from similar cases that the insurance contract cannot be modified by a custom which is binding
only on the insurer - such a custom goes no further than
achieving the status of "a business practice."
In M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Black, 441 S.W.2d
134 (Ky. 1969), suit was brought on an auto insurance
policy. The policy showed on its face that coverage expired January 25, 1965. The accident occurred January
27, 1965, or two days after expiration.
Black claimed coverage under the policy on the theory
that since the insurance company had given him three
free extra days on the original six months policy, it should
have done the same thing on the new policy, which would
have extended the coverage period to January 28.
The appellate court reversed a jury verdict for Black
and stating that the issue should never have been submitted to the jury; the insurer was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
The court also pointed out the inconsistency of plaintiff's argument in bringing this action under the insurance
contract and at the same time denying the clear terms of
the policy as to the expiration date:
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"There is nothing in the record creating any
additional obligation of appellant. A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. [Cites omitted] There was no issue to submit
to the jury." 441 S.W.2d at 136. (Emphasis added.)

Cortina v. General Insurance Co. of America, 40 Misc.
2d 916, 244 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1963), was an action against
an insurer ·and agent to declare coverage on an automobile stolen several days after the insured's policy had expired. No notice was given by General Insurance Company or its agent that the policy to Cortina would not be
renewed. Cortina had secured the policy on September
10, 1955, effective for a period of one year. Hammond,
an agent for General Insurance Company, had last renewed the policy September 10, 1958, to expire September 10,
1959. General Insurance Company cancelled the Hammond Agency on September 1, 1959. Therefore, when the
policy expired on September 10, 1959, Hammond had no
authority to write any insurance for General. Cortina was
not informed of the cancellation of the agency. The plaintiff contended the prior course of conduct led him to believe the policy would be automatically renewed. This
contention was rejected by the New York Court which
stated the policy clearly showed it was not effective on
the date the automobile was stolen.
Siewerdsen v. U.S.F.&G., 184 Neb. 870, 173 N.W.2d
27 ( 1969), involves a set of facts analogous to this case
and points out that a custom to renew a policy does not
bind the insurer unless the custom is equally binding on
the insured. In this case the plaintiff purchased an automobile liability policy on June 6, 1962 from an agency
19
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through a soliciting agent. The policy delivered showed
coverage from June 6, 1962 to June 6, 1963. The policy
expired by its own terms. The soliciting agent who origi
nally obtained the policy entered into an agency agreement
with U.S.F.&G. The agency for U.S.F.&G. did not renew
the policy because the soliciting agent had taken the business. No renewal notice was sent to the insured or to
the soliciting agent by U.S.F.&G. On May 7, 1963,
U.S.F.&G. mailed a renewal policy to the original agency
but this policy was returned for cancellation without notice to the plaintiff. The appellant court, in reversing a
judgment for the plaintiff, stated:
"An insurance policy is a contract which requires an offer and acceptance to be effective.
[Cites omitted.] If there is no obligation as to one
of the parties, there is none as to the other.

*

*

*

"But a custom to renew, even if established,
does not bind the insurer unless it is also binding
upon the insured. There must be a contract to renew as distinguished from a mere custom." 173
N.W.2d at 28.

Brooks v. Renner & Co., 243 Ark. 226, 419 S.W.2d
305 (1967), arose from a loss after the policy expired.
Brooks, the plaintiff, for ten years had insured one or more
automobiles through the Renner Agency. A policy written
annually carried a four month expiration date. Prior to
the expiration date Renner, the agent, received a four
month renewal statement from the insurer. Brooks, however, had moved from Fayetteville to Little Rock, about
200 miles away, and Renner did not renew the policy.
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The policy expired October 3, 1964. After an accident on
November 2, 1965, Brooks sought coverage for the loss
from the Renner Agency and the insurer. Summary judgment was rendered for both defendants.

In affirming the judgment the appellate court emphasized the expiration date was plain and unambiguous
and explained that the agency's past offers of renewal were
over and above the obligation created by the contracts and
that there was no duty to renew.
"We recognize that service agencies are expected to, and usually do take an interest in the
welfare of their regular customers. Ofttimes they
render courtesies over and above the obligations
created by contracts. That is simply good business
.... " 419 S.W.2d at 307.
POINT IV
BECAUSE ALL PRIOR CONVERSATIONS AND
AGREEMENTS ARE MERGED INTO THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT ONCE EXECUTED, IT WAS
ERROR TO ALLOW PAROL EVIDENCE IN CONFLICT WITH THE INSURANCE POLICY.

On direct examination Mr. Barnett was asked:

"Q Now would you tell me what the custom and
practice was between you and Mr. Kimball as
far as renewing your insurance when you ran
out?" (R.169)

This defendant then objected on the basis that no
proper foundation had been laid for the testimony, that it
would be hearsay as concerned what Mr. Kimball might

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

have allegedly said to him, and that the testimony was irrelevant and immaterial to the issue before the court. The
objection was overruled and Mr. Barnett testified:
"A ... He would always notify me either by mail
or in person, mostly in person we transacted our
business.

*

*

*

"A He would either notify me by mail or by statement. I paid all my bills and my insurance by
statement and notice, and by personal contact.

"Q (By Mr. Black) Was there ever any time when
Mr. Kimball himself paid the premium and you
paid him back?
MR. BERRY: Your Honor, I'm going to object, it's
immaterial, irrelevant, and no foundation has
been laid to show that Mr. Kimball was our
agent.
THE WITNESS: Yes he did (R. 170)
Barnett's theory is that because Noble Kimball always notified him concerning renewal of his insurance,
and Richard Salisbury had said he would take care of
Mr. Barnett as Noble Kimball had done, that State Auto
was liable on the policy even after it expired.
Even if Mr. Barnett had specifically asked Richard
Salisbury to renew the policy beyond the October 1, 1967
date, and Salisbury had agreed to do so, the agreement
would be invalid under Utah law.
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Section 31-19-18 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides:

"31-19-18. Contract of insurance - Variations
of terms of policy invalid. - No insurer or its

agent, nor any solicitor or broker shall make any
contract of insurance or agreement as to such contract, other than is plainly expressed in the policy
issued thereon. Any such understanding or agreement not so expressed shall be invalid."
Section 31-19-26 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides:

"31-19-26. Insurance contracts - Modification of. - No modification of any insurance con-

tract shall be effective unless in writing executed by
the insurer and if it contains conditions limiting or
reducing benefits or protection otherwise applicable such writing shall also be executed by the
insured."
The policy clearly states that it expires on October
1, 1967. This provision of the policy could not be waived
without a written endorsement attached to the policy:

"Waiver provisions. No permission affecting this
insurance shall exist, or waiver of any provision
be valid, unless granted herein or expressed in
writing added hereto. No provision, stipulation
or forfeiture shall be held to be waived by any
requirement or proceeding on the part of this company relating to appraisal or to any examination
provided for herein." (Exhibit 1-P)
Under the law as set forth in Jones v. New York Life
Insurance Co., 69 Utah 172, 253 P.200 (1926), Mr. Barnett is charged with knowledge of the policy terms and
bound by them:
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"There is nothing to show that the insured
was induced by any false or erroneous statements
as to the meaning of those provisions and it must
there/ore be presumed that the insured knew the
contents of the application and bound himself by
the terms therein provided. In other words, the
insured was charged with knowledge that no one
save the officers enumerated in the application
could waive any the company's rights or requirements and that notice to the soliciting agent was
not notice to the company and that the agent was
not authorized to accept risks or to pass upon insurability." 253 P. at 202, (Emphasis added.)
In United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Northwestern
National Insurance Co., 185 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1950),
an insured contended that his business insurance policy
provided broader coverage than was clearly shown by the
policy terms.

In reversing a judgment by Judge Willis W. Ritter
for the insured, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Neither can Ogden escape the effects of these
provisions by not having read the policy when it
was delivered to him and thus failing to discover
that it did not contain the broad coverage for which
he now contends. It was his duty to read the policy
when it was delivered to him and he is charged
with knowledge of its provisions, nothwithstanding his failure to do so." Id. at 447 (Emphasis
added.)
It has long been the law of Utah that an insurer cannot be held liable on an expired policy for a loss occurring
after the expiration date.
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An early Utah case is strikingly similar to the present
case, Idaho Forwarding Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co., 8 Utah 41, 29 P. 826 (1892), involved an action
against an insurance company on an alleged contract of
insurance. On February 1, 1889, in consideration of
$46.20 paid as premium, the stock of goods of Idaho Forwarding Company at Hailey, Idaho, were insured for one
year by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company from February 13, 1889 to February 13, 1890. On July 2, 1890
the goods were destroyed by fire.
Mallory, the agent of both parties, had previously
told Albert Kiesel, plaintiff's manager, that $5,000 of the
company's coverage was about to expire. Kiesel instructed
Mallory to renew the coverage and Mallory responded
that he would renew the $2,000 policy with Fireman's
Fund and the remainder with two other companies.
Mallory thought he had renewed the coverage, but
after the fire it was discovered that the premium had not
been paid. Idaho Forwarding Company attempted to pay
the premium six days after the fire.
At trial Kiesel was asked how long the renewed
coverage was to be for. An objection to the question was
overruled. The trial court found for Idaho Forwarding
Company.
On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed. Pointing out that plaintiff's theory as in the matter now before
the court was "upon a contract in praesenti, not a contract
25
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to thereafter insure," the court held it was improper to
have allowed Kiesel to testify to the terms of the written
contract:
"It was improper to call for the conclusion of
the witness as to the term of the insurance, or as
to the premium to be paid. Those facts should
have been found from the language used by the
contractors." 29 P. at 827.
The court also held that Fireman's Fund could not be
liable under an expired policy for Mallory's failure to
renew the policy:
"For the failure to follow plaintiff's orders
the defendant [insurer] cannot be held responsible." 29 P. at 826.
In a later case involving an alleged life insurance
contract, Field v. Missouri State Line Insurance Co., 77
Utah 45, 290 P. 979 (1930), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
"It is an elementary rule of law that, where
parties have reduced an agreement to writing and
such written agreement is not vitiated by fraud or
mutual mistake of fact, all prior conversations and
parol agreements are so merged therein that they
cannot be given in evidence for the purpose of
changing the written contract or any part thereof
nor showing any intention or understanding different from that expressed in the written agreement."
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The court also held that the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel cannot be relied upon to avoid the rule of law
that all prior conversations and agreements between the
parties prior to execution of the written instrument are
merged into the written agreement. Id. at 983.
The testimony of Mr. Barnett and William Slaugh
was presented in contradiction of the policy terms. It obviously was prejudicial to State Auto because it allowed
the jury to ignore the State Auto policy and render averdict based on emotion and not on law.

CONCLUSION
The action against State Auto was one in contract.
It was undisputed that the plaintiffs' home burned after
the State Auto policy expired. Judgment for State Auto
should have been given as a matter of law. This court
should so hold.
The testimony of Mr. Barnett and William Slaugh on
insurers renewal and notice of expiration practices was
improper because it created the impression that State Auto
was bound to renew the Barnett policy because of a custom
State Auto had never participated in vis-a-vis the Barnetts.
The result before the trial court in this case destroys
the laws of written contracts from the requirement of consideration to the principle of expectancy. Plaintiffs, under
their theory, enjoy the luxury of the benefits of insurance
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which can never expire while being free at any time to
drop at any moment the insurer they claim is bound and
take their business elsewhere.
Judgment for State Auto should be given as a matter
of law. At the least a new trial should be ordered.
Respectfully submitted,

Raymond M. Berry of
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
Seventh Floor Continental Bank
Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant State
Automobile & Casualty
Underwriters
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